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The Narrative of Victimization and Deradicalization: An Expert
View
Pauline G. M. Aarten, Eva Mulder, and Antony Pemberton
International Victimology Institute Tilburg (INTERVICT), Tilburg University, Tilburg, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
While the study of victimology and radicalization mainly focuses on
those who suffered from terrorist attacks, this article explores the role
of victimological processes in deradicalization. Experts from different
international deradicalization initiatives were interviewed. Using the
narrative framework with its three key concepts—identity, emotion,
and culture—as set forth by Pemberton and Aarten in this issue, the
relationship between victimization and deradicalization is more
thoroughly examined. Key ﬁndings include the delicacy of the term
“victim” in radicals’ narrative identity, the power of narrative in
triggering and transmitting emotions, and the importance of a former
radical that acknowledges the narratives of the radical and offers
alternative narratives to their radicalized ideologies.
The past ﬁfteen years has seen a marked interest in the plight of victims of terrorism and
political violence, in policy and research.1 The increased public proﬁle of victims of terrorism
and political violence is accompanied by calls for recognition and acknowledgment of their
suffering. The way this recognition is framed includes presenting the position of victims as
sharply distinct from, and opposed to, those of their victimizers.2 This sharp delineation of
victims and perpetrators of terrorism is regularly mimicked by academics studying the vic-
timology and perpetration of terrorism and political violence. The victimology of terrorism
thus mainly revolves around the study of the consequences of terrorist acts for those suffer-
ing the attacks.
Its deﬁnition, however, is somewhat constricted to a small population.3 The social construc-
tion of terms like crime and victimization, abuse of power, terrorism, and radicalization, in
particular when captured in law and public policy, means that many victims are not viewed as
such by other societal actors. Yet, victimization can apply to many other situations than those
involving ofﬁcially certiﬁed victims.4 This position lies at the heart of this article. Instead of
addressing the consequences of political violence and terrorism for their victims, this article
intend to further the understanding of the role of victimological processes in the perpetration
of and stepping away from politically motivated violence by interviewing experts in this ﬁeld
and practitioners working for deradicalization and disengagement initiatives.5 The authors will
argue this position from a narrative point of view as set forth by Pemberton and Aarten in
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this issue. Before this is done, it will ﬁrst justify the application of victimology in the ﬁeld of
political violence and terrorism by identifying what role victimization can play in radicalization
and deradicalization as discussed in theory and previous research.
The Role of Victimization in (De-)Radicalization
A stereotypical black and white distinction between victims and offenders is likely to be
deployed in public discourse, media depictions, and policy statements. In the stereotypes
described by Nils Christie’s notion of the ideal victim6 or Roy Baumeister’s Myth of Pure
Evil,7 this distinction is categorical, with the good and wholesome victims being preyed on
by fundamentally evil offenders.
In crime, reality is often at odds with this neat, black and white division between victims
and offenders. There is a good deal of overlap between victim and offender populations.8 Ado-
lescent men are both overrepresented in the victim and offender statistics, with mere luck or
accident regularly determining in which category they ﬁnd themselves. Additionally, experien-
ces, perceptions, and narratives of victimization frequently inspire perpetrators’ behavior.
Retaliation for past victimization often underlies violence,9 where a sense of entitlement caused
by victimization can provide adequate justiﬁcation for one’s own acts.10 This seems particu-
larly true of group-based violence, such as in political violence and terrorism: narratives of vic-
timization ranging back through the years can still provide motive and cover for violence and
bloodshed in the present.11 As Volkan12 shows in his book Bloodlines, these so-called chosen
traumas form a moral nucleus for politically motivated action, including violence. The experi-
ence of being righteously aggrieved is a particular strong motivation for morally motivated vio-
lence, particularly if this sense of historical victimization can be connected to a present-day
threat. The link between victimization experiences and radicalization can be direct, with vic-
timization experiences serving as a causal factor in the development and extremity of religious
and political views that may motivate political violence and terrorism. For example, McCauley
and Moskalenko describe how personal victimization is one of the pathways, and one of main
explanations given by suicide terrorists, to individual radicalization.13 The link can also be
more indirect, in the sense that victimization experiences are a factor in the escalation of vio-
lence, which may in turn give rise to radicalized political/religious views.14 An example of this
indirect relationship can be found in the recent work on traumatization and the development
of extremist political ideology.15 In a study by Canetti and colleagues on the Israeli–Palestinian
conﬂict, the relationship between exposure to conﬂict violence and a change in citizens’ politi-
cal attitudes and behavior was explored. They found that a prolonged exposure to political vio-
lence increased individuals’ psychological distress, which evoked stronger perceptions of threat.
The perceived threat, in turn, stimulated political attitudes favoring militarism. According to
these scholars “this causal chain fuels a destructive cycle of violence that is hard to break.”16
In addition, the understanding that offenders are intrinsically and inherently evil, as sug-
gested by the myth of the Pure Evil, imposes a retributive perspective on counterterrorism.17
As Bjorgo and Horgan18 note: “‘Once a terrorist, always a terrorist!’ So goes conventional
wisdom.” Through this frame, the ﬁght against terrorism becomes the ﬁght against terrorists,
which can lead to renewed victimization by society on the side of the “terrorist.” This sug-
gests that a full endorsement of the Myth of Pure Evil stands in the way of engaging in any
positive manner with radicals/extremists/terrorists. Yet in most cases, those committing evil
acts are not any more or less intrinsically evil that those who do not. This does not in itself
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excuse the behavior, but it does suggest that changing their behavior is a real possibility. The
point here is that in counterterrorism and counterradicalization policy different issues might
stand in the way of interacting meaningfully with the radical and instead deepen the victimi-
zation experience on the part of the radical.
Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Studying Victimization and Deradicalization:
An Expert View
Having discussed the necessity, but difﬁculty, of studying victimological processes in (de-)radi-
calization, the next step is to understand how victimization works in deradicalization from
political violence. In this issue, Pemberton and Aarten posited narrative as a metaphor for the
study of victimization in political violence. They argue that since victimization is best under-
stood through narrative19 and narrative is a root metaphor for studying radicalization,20 narra-
tive seems the best route to studying victimization in radicalization and deradicalization.
The narrative framework was discussed in detail in that article and will therefore not be
repeated in detail in this article. In summary, narrative is an account of events in the order
in which they occurred to make a point.21 However, not any event will do. A narrative begins
with a particular event and this event “is out of the ordinary, representing a deviation from
the typical or routine aspects of the individual’s life”22 or what Burke refers to as “intentional
trouble.”23 The notion that intentional trouble is involved in getting the narrative ball rolling
can be connected to the victimization experience: the experience of suffering intentional
harm. Previous research has shown that narratives of victimization can play a key role as
nadir experiences and turning points in the stories that radicals and terrorists construct
about their own lives and that of the group to which they belong.24 Either at the individual
level or the group level a sense of past victimization can provide a powerful moral motive for
subsequent acts of violence and aggression.25
Narrative is central to the development of identity and sense and meaning making in the
aftermath of victimization experiences, to triggering or transmitting emotions and to the con-
nection with the wider cultural context.26 Pemberton and Aarten have done a ﬁrst exploration
of better understanding the relationship between victimological processes and radicalization
through this narrative framework. This article empirically explores the relevance of this narra-
tive framework in better understanding the relationship between victimization and deradicali-
zation. Speciﬁcally, this article has two aims: (1) to examine how victimization is related to
deradicalization and (2) to uncover how identity, emotions, and culture can be a useful frame
to understand these victimological processes in deradicalization of political violence.
The focus is merely on deradicalization, since only interviews with experts in the ﬁeld of
deradicalization were held. To understand the relationship between victimization and radi-
calization from a narrative point of view, this article suggests collecting life narratives of (de)
radicalized individuals. In addition, since very little is known about the processes involved in
deradicalization, the authors believe this is especially a pertinent topic to further explore
while using a new framework.
Method
Between September 2014 and September 2015, experts in the ﬁeld of deradicalization and
disengagement were approached. Based on their expertise and experience, they were able to
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give their views on the victimological processes in deradicalization and disengagement. Spe-
ciﬁcally, they shared views on the contribution of victimization to deradicalization processes,
and possible contributions of victimization in counternarratives.
A qualitative design was chosen to obtain an in-depth understanding of the victimological
processes in deradicalization. Semi-structured interviewing was the primary data collection
tool. Choosing a qualitative method, instead of a more quantitative methodology, provided
rich data in an area of research that is still relatively unexplored. Each interview was com-
bined with an extensive documentary analysis of the background of the expert and his or
her organization. Each basic interview schedule was adapted according to the background
information on the experts and their organizations.
Fieldwork was not limited to the Netherlands, but extended to different countries includ-
ing Germany, Sweden, and United Kingdom, and involved interviewing experts from organ-
izations that focused on disengagement from right-wing extremism, organizations that
focused on deradicalization from jihadism, and organizations that were involved in preven-
tion and repression of radicalization. Victim organizations were also interviewed. In total,
sixteen interviews with experts were held.27
When analyzing the empirical data, a two-step approach was used. First, all interviews
were read in detail, looking for quotes about victimization and deradicalization. These
quotes were then checked to see how they ﬁtted within the narrative framework: speciﬁcally,
whether these quotes were related to identity, emotions, and culture. It was found that all
references made to victimization by the interviewed experts could be placed under the head-
ings of identity and meaning-making, emotions and culture conﬁrming the usefulness of
using a narrative framework to further the understanding of victimological processes in
deradicalization.
Results
The objective of this article was to interview experts from different organizations about
the role of victimization in deradicalization.28 As the results show, this role is highly
complex and takes a different form depending on the population targeted or the meth-
odology used. The results, therefore, summarize the main points that experts brought
forth during their interviews regarding the relationship between victimization and dera-
dicalization from a narrative perspective. While some topics and issues were more often
cited by different experts than others, this article is careful in drawing generalizations
from these results. Instead, these interviews highlight the importance of looking at
deradicalization through a narrative lens.
Identity and Meaning-Making
Victimization
According to the narrative framework, speciﬁc episodes, especially negative ones, take an
important place in one’s life story and forms one’s identity. Numerous studies have found a
relationship between victimization and radicalization,29 and the interviewed experts under-
score this relationship as well. In deradicalization, however, it is the acknowledgment or rec-
ognition of it that plays an important role. As experts state, this acknowledgment or
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recognition of victimization can lead to some kind of “societal approval” of the narrative of
the radical, which, in turn, enhances the connection with his or her social surroundings.
While working on deradicalization, professionals argue the importance of the (former)
radical him or herself having an adequate understanding of the negative experiences in their
past that contributed to their violence:
It has two sides. On one side, you must objectively provide a person perspective regarding work,
a partner, a home, or things like that. On the other side, it is also giving them that recognition.
But they have to discover that themselves. You have to make people more self-conscious again.
It does not involve you acting as a therapist being nice every time so that person regains his or
her conﬁdence or feels less victimized.
While victimization plays a role in helping individual deradicalize, there are two issues
experts highlight. On the one hand, a number of experts caution that (former) radicals
should not be allowed to merely interpret their own misdeeds as justiﬁed reactions to wrong-
doing. Even granted that they have their own victimization experiences, they should also be
enticed to acknowledge their own acts of violence as unwarranted. The experts state that vic-
timization is merely one side of the coin and the other side is equally important:
At some point you have to disconnect things from one another. On one side that you were a vic-
tim or you feel like a victim, and on the other side your current behavior: this should not be seen
as a one-on-one explanation. You may have had a rotten childhood. That is ﬁne and that should
be recognized. But it does not mean that every time you pass a foreigner on the street you beat
him up. That is not a logical conclusion. The issue here is your biography. People must come to
terms with themselves about their biography. There should be less “and thus, and thus” in a
story. This is what people often do, because they need that causality. It is about disconnecting
experiences that involved “and thus I did this.” Especially when “thus” is negative. They have to
learn how to get the positive out of an experience.
On the other hand, in numerous interviews, experts ﬁnd a “recognition of victimization”
a difﬁcult concept to grasp as it consists of many layers. The difﬁculty does not always lie
with the professional recognition that the radicalized individual was victimized, but it is
often the individual himself or herself that has difﬁculty accepting it:
The word “victim” rarely comes up in general in this type of work. Because if I would throw that
around, most clients would go “what are you calling me? […] They deﬁnitely don’t want to see
themselves as victim. It is because there would be an association with fear and being weak and
they want to be an agent, they want to be in control. And I think you are getting one of the key
factors here: power, control.”
It does not mean that radical individuals did not experience any victimization. Instead, it
they ﬁnd the term victim to be disempowering and passive30 and refuse to use victimization
as a means to describe their experiences. One way these individuals can retain their agency
is through ideology.
Ideology as Meaning-Making
Ideology is a way of making meaning: it is a way of explaining the causes of the event, the
consequences on him or herself and the further development of their story.31 In other words,
ideology is the narrative attention that is needed in certain events—such as victimization—to
help construct the radical’s life story. Indeed, the way that a person responds to these key
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personal event memories is important to the way the person subsequently deﬁnes his or her-
self.32 An ideology becomes part of someone’s identity, but is also a means to incorporate
victimization experiences in a manner that does not denote passivity and helplessness. In
other words, victimization as such is often rejected as being part of the radical’s narrative
identity. Instead, the victimization experience itself is transformed through embracing ideol-
ogy as a way to give meaning to and deal with such negative events.
But while many do not identify themselves as victims, in the life narrative of the radical-
ized individual, the story of his or her own (sense of) victimization is given attention in dera-
dicalization initiatives. Research has shown that victimization has an enduring purchase on
his or her current lived experience. In explaining current or recent actions, particularly
when justiﬁcation is called for, the individual will draw on these experiences. Deradicaliza-
tion efforts acknowledge the importance of dealing with negative experiences and focus on
changing the events of radicalized individuals from contamination (turning an experience
into a negative one) to redemption (turning an experience into a positive one) scripts.33 Let-
ting individuals see themselves as a perpetrator and as a victim allows them to reﬂect on
their past and accept their responsibility, which, according to the interviewed experts, helps
in the deradicalization process. By linking the past with the present and future allows the
radical to construct a coherent life story that explains how the self came to be and where it is
headed in the future, giving his life (new) semblance of meaning, unity and purpose.34 And
while different experts stress that it is not central in their initiatives—since they mainly focus
on how behavior and ideology can be changed—victimization is often implicitly tackled.
In many deradicalization and disengagement initiatives, the focus is mainly on developing
new or adapted identities and ideologies for deradicalized individuals. Experts are more
likely to see victimization as playing an implicit role in rebuilding an individual’s new iden-
tity. Many agree that individuals need to distance themselves from the ideology in order to
deradicalize. However, leaving an ideology behind is not done “cold turkey” but tends to be
a more gradual process:
Someone’s identity, once they, in addition to being a soldier for the white race are also a father,
that new identity can start to replace and ﬁll the need where the extremist movement has previ-
ously ﬁlled in terms of someone giving a sense of place in the world. That is something that we
see across the board. There are very few eureka moments, there are very few members that
woke up one day and someone made a really compelling argument to them and they renounce
their ideology. It tends to be more of a process.
Building an identity follows a similar process, consisting of past and present experiences:
It doesn’t work when you say “okay, it is all new” [the identity]. There is always some history in
the current identity. So it’s something like rebuilding. There was also an identity before becom-
ing a Neo-nazi. So it doesn’t work if you say, okay new identity. It is something like rebuilding
and handling all parts of the history. That is the main idea.
What needs to be recognized here is the role of the life narrative of the radical in main-
taining the sense of self-continuity throughout time.35 A radical and swift break with the
person’s identity as a Neo-Nazi or jihadi does not offer much in the way of providing this
continuity. That type of swift catharsis appears a less likely scenario than a more gradual
process in which elements of the identity as a radical are retained, reworked or reinterpreted.
562 P. G. M. AARTEN ET AL.
Emotion
According to the narrative framework, narratives can trigger emotions and they can transmit
emotions.36 Both have gotten much merit in the interviews with deradicalization experts,
where the former is explicated in the experts’ discussion of the emotions that are involved in
radicalization and deradicalization. The latter, the transmission of emotions, can be trans-
lated into how experts saw radicals looking at the experiences of their victims. Both are
described in more detail below.
The Radical’s Emotions
The narrative framework posits that nuclear episodes, such as victimization, can trigger
strong emotion(s).37 These emotions can give rise to a host of action tendencies.38 In line
with previous research,39 the interviewed experts named different negative emotions that
they considered to be related to radicalization. Many found the radicalized individuals to
have feelings of anger and hatred. Other emotions mentioned were feelings of dissatisfaction
and humiliation. Experts also argued the importance of examining how the individual’s
emotions led them to evaluate a situation or experience that subsequently led to (radical)
action. They proposed that the best way to counter these emotionally laden situations was
for them and other practitioners to introduce other emotions that could lead to a renewed
evaluation of the situation. As stated by one of the experts: “The idea that you can tackle an
emotionally complex situation with rationality is very questionable.” In other words, they
argue that deradicalization initiatives should not only be based on a rational approach, but
also focus on and incorporate affect. And while rational choice has dominated terrorism
research,40 experts clearly argue for the importance of examining and tackling the radicals’
emotions in their line of work.
It can also help them disentangle the different emotions and the order in which they
inﬂuence radicalization and deradicalization. One of the initiatives, for example, works with
a model that distinguishes between primary and secondary emotions. Primary emotions are
those that are felt as a ﬁrst response to a situation. These emotions are often fear and happi-
ness. Secondary emotions replace the primary emotions relatively quickly in a situation,
making it difﬁcult to understand what the situation is really about. Anger is often considered
a secondary emotion:
They [right-wing extremists] have an excess of primary emotions which they make into second-
ary emotions. This makes them look to the outside of the world as cold-hearted bastards. But
they are not, they are really feeling a lot, but they cannot handle it. So they ﬁnd a mechanism to
survive it.
With this quote, the interviewed expert implies that the turning of primary emotions into
secondary emotions is done through narrative. That is, the emotion that follows an event is
inﬂuenced by the way the radical sees or wants to see him- or herself. This results in a trans-
formation of secondary emotions that are more in line with the radical’s narrative identity.
According to this expert, a former radical himself, the radical does not want to see himself as
helpless or passive. Instead, he takes control over his life and the “mechanism” that will help
him survive is through anger, indignation, and moral outrage from which he can act.
Furthermore, experts highlight the complexity of the concept victimization when working
with emotions but also the risk that comes along with the narrative of victimization:
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If you have primary emotions which are shut off, and to be a victim, you have to be aware of
your primary emotions. You have to be able to feel it. […] This is a problem when you are talk-
ing about being a victim, if you are talking about the clients I work with as victims. You cannot
process it into secondary emotions because it does not work. So ﬁrst you have to learn how to
feel primary emotions and then we can talk about it. Okay, lets be a victim, how does that corre-
late to your world, because that is not an option in the world that we are in. They will say: I am
not a victim, I am the force. I am not a victim, I am a soldier. The people I come across are not
victims. Lets say I am have a problem with society, so the people I hurt, they are not victims,
they are participants of war. So they are legal targets. And that is also when you look at distanc-
ing, dehumanization, black and white thinking. If you have legal targets, you don’t have to feel
remorse. So victimization is complicated.
This counters the notion that empathy with their victims’ suffering and the emotions that
accompany this can be marshaled as a means to get the radical to see the error of his ways.
This particular point—acknowledging or understanding their victims’ suffering—is further
discussed in the next section on emotions. What this quote further shows is that radicals do
not see the presence of victims or victimization at all. Any fear, sadness, or humiliation on
the part of those who are legitimate opponents in the eyes of the radical should not be inter-
preted as potential antidotes to neutralization techniques. Instead, depending on how they
are placed into the radical’s own narrative, they can be understood as success stories, as evi-
dence of the weakness of the opponent. This is in line with Shadd Maruna’s41 work that
shows that many offenders who desist from the perpetration of violence view themselves as
more rather than less moral: overcoming the conditions that led them to violence in the ﬁrst
place is felt to be evidence of this fact. Instead of disparaging their former selves, they main-
tain a strong sense of continuity with their past narrative selves, chalking up their actions to
causes outside of themselves. With regard to former radicals: they can maintain that their
ideology, religious attitude, and/or political position is still accurate, but now ﬁnd other,
maybe more effective ways of attempting to achieve these goals.42
In summary, gaining insight into the emotions of radicals is often the primary inroad into
understanding and changing the behavior of the extremist, at least initially. Working on a
broader emotional perspective is an important part of disengaging: “They need to be pro-
vided with a broader perspective on their own emotions, letting them know that there is
more than hatred.”
Understanding Victims’ Experiences
Narrative also transmits emotions. This transmission often takes form in preventive strate-
gies where formers and/or victims of political violence tell their narrative to the general
public.
According to Oatley’s taxonomy of emotional response,43 there is an assimilative and
accommodative schema. The ﬁrst draws the listener in, leading to empathic and interactional
responses toward the narrator. The second schema has to overcome resistance from the lis-
tener, making easy assimilation more difﬁcult. Rehabilitative efforts to achieve desistance
attempt to bring about an understanding of the consequences of the perpetrators’ acts for
their victims. This connects with the research that consistently shows lack of empathy as a
criminogenic risk factor.44 Rehabilitation programs increasingly feature victim awareness
and victim empathy components,45 which is in line with the assimilative schema. However,
almost unanimously, experts are of the opinion that collaboration between formers and
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victims is more effective in preventive strategies than in deradicalization initiatives. In fact,
employing victim narratives as a deradicalization method could be counterproductive, which
is in line with Oatley’s accommodative schema:
We thought that if a victim would tell his or her story, they [the extremists] would stop. And
there were a number of studies that pointed towards this relationship. However, we realized
very quickly that this would not work. If you asked a victim to tell her story to a hard-boiled
Neo-nazi or jihadist, an opposite reaction was found. They would say: “It is a good thing. They
should have gotten more of you. You feel bad because we shot your husband to bits. Well that
was our purpose otherwise the ETA or the IRA would not have done it.”43
In other words, increasing victim awareness is difﬁcult to realize in programs targeting
deradicalization. Here the notion of competitive victimhood (CV)46 can be important to
explain the problems with raising victim awareness among radicals. As Noor and colleagues
emphasize “in the CV state, members of conﬂicting groups experience a strong wish, and
thus also strive to establish that their in-group was subjected to more injustice and suffering
at the hands of the out-group than the other way around.”46 Due to the competitive nature
of CV, groups are less likely to experience and display empathy for victimization of their
adversaries,47 even when this amounts to equal or greater suffering than that of the ingroup.
Some experts ﬁnd it difﬁcult to represent two different kinds of interest at the same time:
that of formers and that of victims: “Sometimes there is a former getting in contact with a
victim, but it is difﬁcult. As an NGO we don’t work with victims, because its two shoes on
the same person, but two shoes.”
The victim’s narrative would have defensive, counterproductive effects on the deradicali-
zation process. For this reason, the practitioner from the above quote only works with for-
mers. However, other initiatives highlight the impact of a combined narrative of both
former and victim on the public:
We think that a lot of the time when they come together, their message can be more impactful
than they would be alone. Essentially, formers and survivors together can be greater than the
sum of their parts. […] I think that sometimes when formers speak, there can be a perception
that they shouldn’t necessarily be given that platform or that they shouldn’t be forgiven for
what they have done. But if you have a former standing up with a survivor and that survivor is
now working with that individual. There are instances where they have been directly interacting
with each other and they have forgiven them, it is disarming somewhat.
By giving the platform to formers and victims, the counternarratives become credible and
empathetic, and often reaches an assimilative audience:
I think formers can add a level of credibility, having lived it themselves, knowing what it was
really like. If they can say these things, then we can start to alter these perceived rewards and
costs. And so too are victims, on the empathy level. They can start to play with the emotional
counter-narratives: How can you really do this? You are just killing civilians.
In other words, formers with victims are seen as credible storytellers, who are capable of
transmitting their narrative and its emotional content to an assimilative audience. How the
story of both former and victim can have an impact is still under much debate, but experts
highlight that success stories are mainly found in preventive strategies. In deradicalization
initiatives, experts ﬁnd that radicals are more likely to be an accommodative listener when
confronted with a victim’s narrative.
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Culture
Cultural narratives provide the very images, metaphors, scripts, and plots that individuals
can relate to and shape their narrative identity. These cultural narratives not only provide a
sense of self-continuity, but also continuity with the other members of one’s community.48
In cultural narratives social interactions play a key role. Through interactions with others
stories about personal experiences, such as victimization, are processed, edited, reinter-
preted, retold, and gradually represented internally. Furthermore, being exposed to a range
of social and discursive inﬂuences allows the storyteller to develop a more integrative narra-
tive identity.49 Many of the interviewed experts discussed how a former offers the chance to
reinterpret the radical’s narrative identity. The former can provide a menu of metaphors,
scripts, and plots the radical can choose from. And through co-construction of the story-
teller—in this case the radical—and the listener—in this case the former—the narrative can
be reconstructed.50 In other words, the mainstream cultural narrative can be adopted in the
radical’s narrative identity. Experts ﬁnd that a former extremist can help re-interpret the
story and act as a vessel that channels society’s main norms and values in a manner that
helps the radical to accept them. Furthermore, the “listener” inﬂuences the conversation by
eliciting opinions using his or her expertise to make evaluations.51 The experienced victimi-
zation, for example, is re-evaluated by the former. And instead of opposing the subcultural
master-narrative inherent to the radical’s ideology, the former extremist offers an alternative
to this.
Former extremists are the credible messengers that can build a relationship with extrem-
ists who want to deradicalize. The identiﬁcation that the extremists experience with these
formers lends credence and legitimacy to their views. The same narrative will be interpreted
in a very different and less positive way if the source is a traditional authority. Instead of ini-
tial resistance the former is more likely to be met with assimilative listening styles (which
ties in nicely with narrative emotion), while his or her narrative also has the ring of authen-
ticity to it. This strategy exploits the inherent Janus-face that Francesca Polletta52 analyses in
narratives. She emphasizes that the same stories may be seen as unique/special versus idio-
syncratic/unrepresentative; universal/of interest versus mundane/uninteresting; authentic
versus deceptive/manipulative; an expression of potency versus an expression of powerless-
ness. The narrative of the former is more likely to be interpreted as an authentic tale to
which the radical can aspire, while the same story can be seen as an act of deception or as a
cop-out from another source.
We can be a credible messenger and we can link people from this world with people they don’t
trust here, like psychiatrists, therapists or police or whatever. If someone is violent, we can start
training or go to the gym, if they need aggression replacement training we put that in. But that
is based on a strong alliance and will help them normalize: how does it feel to interact with the
world.
Besides trust, the messenger also becomes a “story of hope. They use him as a tool to
think with. His story inspires how they can change.”
Formers are also considered credible messengers in preventing individuals from (further)
radicalizing:
We make some counter-narratives with former neo-Nazis, video projects on YouTube, texts,
writings from former neo-Nazis or discuss on the Internet or with children in schools, some-
thing like prevention.
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Using former neo-Nazis “as a living counternarrative” is part of rebuilding their identity
and dropping out process. They want to do something good to make up for the bad things
they have done. They not only “talk the talk” but also “walk the walk” of re-interpreting their
former actions in a manner that maintains coherence and continuity,53 but also offers a real
possibility of behavioral and often attitudinal change.
Discussion
This article argues that the narrative framework can be a useful starting point in the
research ﬁeld on political violence and terrorism to give more insight into the victimo-
logical processes related to deradicalization. Speciﬁcally, it looked at the role that vic-
timization plays in deradicalization. The theoretical foundations have been laid down
by Pemberton and Aarten in this issue. This article brought together the main ﬁndings
from the theoretical framework with practice; the experts’ view from different preven-
tive and deradicalization initiatives on how victimization and victimological processes
play a role in deradicalization. Not only is there a better understanding of how victimo-
logical processes play a role in deradicalization, the experts’ views support the idea that
narrative can be considered a useful framework in this ﬁeld. It appears to be the the-
ory-in-use in their own work. Based on the interviews, the following conclusions can
be drawn. As was done in the results section, this article needs to stress again that the
conclusions below cannot be generalized to the ﬁeld of deradicalization. In total 16
interviews were conducted, reaching a diverse range of expertise, but these interviews
have only reached the tip of the iceberg in the understanding of the victimological pro-
cesses in deradicalization. Instead, these ﬁndings and conclusions highlight the value of
a new framework in the study of terrorism and political violence; that of narrative.
The Role of Identity and Meaning-Making in the Relationship Between Victimization
and Deradicalization
The narrative framework emphasizes the role of victimization in the sense of self and iden-
tity in persons engaged in the process of deradicalization.
Disentangling the impact of victimization is, however, made complicated due to the fact
that it is not likely that individuals will view themselves as victims and conceptualize their
actions as reactions to victimization. Instead, the radical ideology can provide the means to
transform a victimization event from a possible sign of weakness or defeat into a rallying cry
for action and demonstration of strength. Victimization seems to provide part of the moral
justiﬁcation, or necessity even, for subsequent violence on the part of the radical him- or her-
self. But as this behavior in reality, or at least in intent, turns the tables on the victimization,
the radical no longer sees him- or herself as a victim, but as one who is in the process of or
vanquishing his or her foes.
When the radical attempts to leave the extremist or terrorist group behind, he can be con-
fronted with a negative reaction from society, which gives rise to a sense of a renewed but
perhaps different sense of victimization. Acknowledging this possible experience of victimi-
zation is an important element of deradicalization initiatives, even though the experts do not
suggest that former radicals should be let off the hook in the confrontation with their former
misdeeds. However, care should be taken to see how the radical ideology offered a
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transformative sense of protection and meaning to previous victimization experiences, and
how leaving the radical group behind can already involve renewed feelings of vulnerability.
It is important to note that the interviewed experts largely conﬁrm the authors’ view that
interpreting radical views is best understood as a matter of identity, rather than merely of
attitude. These radical views are a means through which people make sense of the world and
of their selves. It is important to integrate life narratives in future research on the cognitions
of radicals and those who have attempted to leave political violence behind. The authors
understand how life narratives play in their sense of self, in their construction of their per-
sonal ideologies and the implications this has for deradicalization efforts. Fortunately, this
ﬁeld has already progressed beyond viewing terrorists either as purely rational actors or as
mentally deranged, and are beginning to see political violence in terms of the goals and
quests on which people embark to provide meaning in their lives.54 To this it should be
added that it is not only the “self as motivated agent” that is important to the understanding
of what makes a person turn to radicalization, but also the “self as autobiographical
author.”55 However misguided a person might be in understanding his or her own life story,
and however biased this account may be, it nevertheless forms an important base from
which further actions develop. Not only for the radical himself, but also for practitioners
helping individuals deradicalize.
The life story of radicals and former radicals can contain a number of so-called narrative
ruptures. Any severe form of victimization can disturb the sense of continuity a life narrative
seeks to maintain: sense- and meaning-making in the aftermath of victimization concerns
reworking and rebuilding this life narrative. Ideology has been mentioned by several experts
as a way that radicals make sense of previous victimization they have encountered. The fruits
of this process can include the seeds of what eventually becomes a career in political violence
and radical political activity. For those deeply embedded in radical groups and terrorist
organizations, any move away from the former life can also be felt to be a narrative rupture,
in which the same tasks are encountered. Given the current understanding of personality
and identity as relying in large part on life narratives, this article proposes that the use of
(victimization) narratives could be more fully applied to the study of terrorism and political
violence than is done at the current moment.
The Role of Emotions in the Relationship Between Victimization and Deradicalization
Recently, terrorism research, like research into political phenomena more generally, has been
engaging more fully with the increasingly rich literature on emotions. Haidt and colleagues56
mention a number of different emotions associated with the experience of victimization:
anxiety, hate, humiliation fury, disgust, anger and moral outrage, shame, revenge, but also
positive emotions, deﬁant pride, exhilaration, excitement, and ingroup love. Emotions are
inherent to (understanding) the reactions to victimization and what drives individuals to
action. As the experts argue, hate and anger are powerful emotions that are often found to
drive individuals into radicalized behavior. Victimization narratives also transmit these emo-
tions. Empathy and sympathy, for example, play an important role in understanding reac-
tions to victimization and the transmission of emotions of victimization experiences.
The view that empathy for victims’ experiences does not necessarily stimulate a (former)
radical to feel remorse and guilt for his or her past wrongdoing was conﬁrmed in the inter-
views. In general, the transmission of emotion through narrative is moderated by the
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division between assimilative and accommodative listening.57 In the former, the listener is
biased toward agreeing with the messenger; in the latter to disagreeing and/ or viewing the
messenger in an unfavorable light. This also underlies the importance of the understanding
that who tells the story is as important as what is being communicated. The results of the
interviews conﬁrm that confronting radicals with the suffering of their victims is likely to
trigger a defensive response, in which the victim got what was coming to him or her. Instead
of triggering sympathy for their victims, tales of victimization of the erstwhile enemy can
lead to phenomena signaling competitive victimhood. Either their own victimization experi-
ence or their sympathetic feelings toward ingroup members are likely to trump any compas-
sion felt with the outgroup’s sense of victimization. Indeed, pitting the victimization
experience of the outgroup against that of the radical’s him- or herself is more likely to rein-
vigorate such a comparison. Whether and how radicals should be confronted with victimiza-
tion experiences of others is in need of further empirical clariﬁcation.
There is more optimism about the use of victimization narratives in preventing radicaliza-
tion. This can also include collaboration between formers and victims. The interviewed
experts highlight numerous times that narratives have a greater impact on youth at risk or
the general public, and there are cases that show that impact is even greater when formers
and victims tell their stories together. The extent formers and victims have an impact, how-
ever, does remain a matter of debate.
The Role of Culture in the Relationship Between Victimization and Deradicalization
Finally, there is the importance of narrative in culture. Much of the deradicalization work
involves attempts to connect radicals to important ﬁgures outside the radical social move-
ment. This is very much in line with what Hammack and Pilecki argue: “to see oneself as the
same from one day to the next, but also to see oneself as engaged in a process that is the
same as others.”58
Experts see that formers are best placed to make, at least the initial, contact with radicals
wanting to leave the group. The sharing of a similar past gives these formers a credibility
allowing radicals to open up to them. This relationship needs to be based on mutual trust,
openness and continuance for it to be successful. Formers can serve an important function,
not only by what they say and the credence other radicals might attach to their tales, but
also by their own example as a living counternarrative. Radicals are more likely to listen to
these formers, which, in turn, allow the formers to help in re-interpreting their narrative, the
negative events (such as victimization) and re-deﬁning their identity.
It should be noted that although the relationship between culture, radicalization, and vic-
timization was not discussed by the experts in the interviews, the above suggests at least an
indirect relationship. Through culture—a strong and supportive network and getting help
from someone with a similar past—can past victimization be reinterpreted and future vic-
timization be prevented.
Concluding Remarks
This article aimed to uncover if there is a relationship between victimization and deradicaliza-
tion and whether a narrative framework can enhance the understanding of victimological pro-
cesses in deradicalization of political violence. The interviews with professionals indeed
STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 569
conﬁrmed a relation between victimization deradicalization, but this relationship is complex,
making a straightforward interpretation difﬁcult. The narrative framework offers a way of inter-
preting and further the understanding of this relation. Speciﬁcally, through identity, emotions,
and culture this article has shown how victimization can directly or indirectly impact deradical-
ization. And while a ﬁrst empirical exploration of the narrative framework in enhancing the
understanding of deradicalization has been done, the authors hope that other scholars continue
this journey, which can further enhance theories and best practices concerning deradicalization.
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